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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Warren L. Swanson and Roger W. Eichmeier*

Are the Courts Handcuffing the Police?-A
recent symposium in volume 52 of the Northwestern University Law Review at page 1 has
examined the relationship between law and
police practices and presents varying evaluations of both the restrictions on the conduct of
law enforcement officers and the safeguards
from police abuses which the law provides. In
an article entitled Restrictimons in the Law of
Arrest, James Coakley, district attorney of
Alameda County, California, notes that the
laws governing arrest have been virtually unchanged for centuries. They encourage false
arrest suits, he argues, and hamper law enforcement. He advocates legislation which would
afford police greater freedom in apprehending
criminals. In an article entitled Safeguards in
the Law of Arrest, Professor Caleb Foote
presents evidence of a variance between arrest
laws and actual police practices. He questions
the validity of affording the police greater
freedom through a relaxation of the laws.
Noting examples of abuses by police, he suggests a congressional investigation to obtain
adequate facts upon which to resolve the questions of proper police powers. Virgil Peterson,
Operating Director of the Chicago Crime
Commission, in an article dealing with restrictions in the law of search and seizure, criticizes
the exclusionary rule and argues that courts
should limit their role to securing trustworthy
evidence rather than summarily judging and
punishing alleged police misconduct through the
exclusion of evidence. Noting the abuses
attendant upon the application of the exclusionary rule, he advocates as an alternative the
creation of a Civil Rights Office in every
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute
police misconduct. Professor Monrad G.
Paulsen, on the other hand, points out 'safe'Senior Law Students, Northwestern University
School of Law.

guards in the law of search and seizure and
argues in support of the exclusionary rule. He
maintains that "states can't deliberately
violate the Constitution without the loss of
public respect" and that, even if police misconduct is not deterred by the exclusionary
rule, it does permit courts to protest and to
avoid sanctioning such conduct. With respect to
restrictions in the law of interrogation and
confessions, Professor Fred E. Inbau argues
that judicial restrictions on reasonable interrogation techniques may prevent the solution
of many crimes. He suggests that the only
feasible solution to police abuses is through obtaining better qualified officers rather than
through judicial supervision. In contrast,
Judge Samuel Leibowitz, discussing safeguards
in the law of interrogation, maintains that
courts have an obligation to enforce the Constitution and cannot ignore misconduct on-the
part of law enforcement officers. (Copies of the
Northwestern University Law Review containing this symposium may be obtained at a
cost of S1.50. Address: 357 East Chicago
Avenue, Chicago 11, Illinois)
Oklahoma Enacts Shoplifting Legislation
-- On April 2, 1957, the state of Oklahoma
enacted legislation designed to. expedite the
apprehension of shoplifters. The statute rovides that a police officer, a merchant, or his
employee, "who has probable cause for believing that merchandise held for sale by the
merchant has been unlawfully taken by a
person and that he can recover such merchandise by taking the person into custody,
may, for the purpose of attempting to effect
such recovery, take the person into custody
and detain him in a reasonable manner for a
reasonable length of time, until a duly authorized officer can be summoned." In addition, the Act authorizes a police officer to
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arrest, without a warrant, "any person he has
probable cause for believing has committed
larceny of merchandise held for sale in retail or
wholesale establishments when such arrest is
made in a reasonable manner." An Act Relating
to Larceny of Merchandise Held for Sale, OKrA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §1341 (Pamphlet Supp.
April, 1957).
The Oklahoma statute is the latest of several
recent efforts to solve the shoplifting problem
by means of legislation. Florida has enacted
legislation which is similar to the Oklahoma
Act but which, in addition, expressly affords
the merchant a degree of immunity from civil
liability for false imprisonment when attempting to recover his goods. FiA. STAT. ANN.
§881.02 (Supp. 1955). A recent Maine statute
penalizes the "willful concealment of merchandise" as a misdemeanor. ME. REv. STAT.
c. 132, §10-a (Supp. 1955). In addition, South
Carolina has enacted legislation which provides
that the possession of merchandise concealed on
a suspect's person shall create a presumption of
guilt. So. CAR. AcTs. No. 838 (1956). And a
recent Utah statute classifies a shoplifter as a
"vagrant." UTAH COnE ANN. §76-61-1 (Supp.
1956).
An analysis of the effectiveness and constitutionality of recent shoplifting legislation will
appear in a forthcoming issue of this Journal.
Juvenile Curfew Law Held Invalid-The
defendant was charged with aiding a minor in
violating a city ordinance which prohibited a
minor under the age of seventeen years from
being in a public place between 10:00 P.M.
and 5:00 A.M. unless accompanied by a parent
or required to be present by "some legitimate
business, trade, profession or occupation in
which said minor is engaged." On appeal from
the denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss
the complaint, the appellate court reversed,
holding that the statute was a denial of due
process of law and hence invalid. Alves v.
Justice Ct. of Chico, 306 P.2d 601 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
of App. 1957).
The state maintained that the words "legitimate business" should be interpreted to
mean any legitimate activity and that, if this

construction were adopted, the statute would
not restrict a minor's legitimate conduct. The
court, lowever, adopted the defendant's argument that the exception to the curfew contained in the ordinance includes only employment activities. The court noted, moreover,
that even if "legitimate business" were interpreted to mean "legitimate activity", the ordinance contains the additional factor that the
minor's presence be "required." Since a minor's
presence at such legitimate activities as church,
a football game or a school dance is voluntary
rather than required, the ordinance would
forbid it. While a municipality, the court said,
has the inherent police power to enact legislation restricting the freedom of its citizens when
the general welfare requires it, such legislation
must be reasonably related to its objectives.
The court approved of the objective of the ordinance in seeking to attain "a better control of
juveniles during the late hours of the night."
But while the ordinance would "preclude
aimless loitering by minors in public places,"
the court concluded that it "would also make
unlawful many other activities by minors which
otherwise would be entirely lawful."
Michigan Obscenity Statute Violates Fourteenth Amendment-Following the sale by the
defendant to a police officer of a book containing
allegedly obscene material, the defendant was
arrested and charged with violating Mica.
Con. LAws §343 (Supp. 1954) which prohibits the sale of any "publication or other
thing, including any recordings, containing
obscene, immoral, lewd or lascivious language,
or obscene, immoral, lewd or lascivious prints,
pictures, figures or descriptions, tending to
incite minors to violent or depraved or immoral
acts, manifestly tending to the corruption of
the morals of youth." At the trial in a state
court, the defendant made a motion to dismiss
the proceedings on the ground that the statute
was an unreasonable restriction upon freedom
of speech and therefore violative of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The statute, it was argued, prohibits the sale of
a book to adults solely on the basis of the undesirable influence which the publication may
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have upon the youth. The trial court denied the
motion and found the defendant guilty "because he sold a book containing this language
(the passages deemed offensive), and also because the court feels that even viewing the book
as a whole, it (the objectionable language) was
not necessary to the proper development of the
theme of the book nor of the conflict expressed
therein." Upon the denial by the Supreme
Court of Michigan of the defendant's application for leave to appeal, the defendant petitioned for and was granted certiorari by the
United States Supreme Court. That Court
reversed the defendant's conviction, holding
that the statute violates the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Butler v. State of
Michigan, 77 Sup. Ct. 524 (1957).
The Court rejected the state's contention
that "quarantining the general reading public
against books not too rugged for grown men
and women in order to shield juvenile innocence," is a valid exercise of the state's
power to promote the general welfare. "Surely,"
the Court said, "this is to burn the house to
roast the pig." The Court noted that Michigan
has a statute, other than the one in issue,
specifically designed to protect juveniles against
nbscene materials. The statute involved here,
was said, restricts adults to reading only
miaterial which is suitable for children. This
gislation, the court concluded, "is not reason.tbly restricted to the evil with which it is said
to deal" and hence is a denial of due process.
Confession Obtained During Thirty Hour
Delay In Arraignment Held Inadmissible in
Federal Court; Judge Rather than Jury Must
Determine Illegality of Delay-The defendant
ummoned police at 6:15 A.M., on a Sunday,
reporting that her husband had been murdered
hy an unknown assailant. One hour later,
police arrested the defendant for her husband's
aurder and took her to police headquarters.
"-here she was subjected to intermittent periods
f interrogation of a half to one hour's duration
until 8:30 P.M. when she was permitted
several hours of rest. Between 12:00 and 3:00
..M. the following morning, she was awakened
-id questioned for an hour, at the end of wh.ch
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she made an oral confession. The defendant
was not arraigned until 11:00 A.M. Monday
morning. There was no evidence of police
misconduct during the interrbgation. At the
trial in a federal district court, the defendant
objected to the admission in evidence of testimony concerning her oral confession on the
grounds that it was obtained in violation of
rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure which requires that an arrested
person be arraigned "without unnecessary
delay." The trial court indicated that the delay
in arraignment may have been illegal, but ruled
that, in addition to an illegal delay, "a showing
of a patent denial of due process by coercion"
is a prerequisite to the exclusion of a confession.
In addition, the court decided that, since
coercion had not been established as a matter
of law, the confession was admissible and the
issue of coercion was one for the jury. On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, with three
members dissenting, reversed the defendant's
conviction, holding that the confession should
have been excluded. Rettig v. United States,
239 F. 2d 916 (D. C. Cir. 1956).
A majority of the court, while agreeing that
the confession was inadmissible, differed as to
the reasons for its exclusion. Four judges
adopted the position that the rule expounded by
the United States Supreme Court in McNabb v.
United States, 318 U. S.332 (1942), required the
exclusion of the confession. These judges examined that case and the subsequent Supreme
Court decisions which have applied the McNabb
rule and concluded that the rule does not
require physical or psychological coercion for
its application. "The McNabb rule," it was
said, "operates as a sanction against police
irregularities that create an opportunity for
third degree methods by compelling an accused
to face his questioners incommunicado, uncounseled, and uninformed of his rights." Thus,
it was concluded that any unnecessary delay
in arraignment would, without more, result in
the exclusion of a confession obtained during
its continuance. In answer to the prosecution's
argument that the interrogation took place on a
Sunday when federal commissioners were un-

19571

POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES

available, it was said that there was no evidence
that "reasonable and bonafide efforts" were
made to find a magistrate. In addition, it was
said that, even if a magistrate were unavailable,
the delay would nevertheless be illegal because
the police failed to advise the defendant of her
right to remain silent and to secure counsel,
which the committing magistrate would have
been required to do upon arraignment. With
respect to the function of judge and jury in
applying the McNabb rule, it was said that the
judge, rather than the jury, must perform this
role.
In a concurring opinion, two judges, while
agreeing that the confession should have been
excluded, applied a different interpretation of
the McNabb rule. These judges, examining the
McNabb case in the light of subsequent decisions, held that an illegal delay in arraignment
will not invalidate a confession obtained during
the detention unless the delay in arraignment
produced the disclosure. "McNabb," it was
said, "is based upon the premise that when
there had been inexcusable detention for the
purpose of illegally extracting evidence from
an accused, coupled with the successful extraction of inculpatory disclosures as a result of
continuous questioning for many hours under
psychological pressure, the statements of the
accused so produced shall not be received."
In th( present case. the concurring opinion
concluded, the kungth of the delay, the fact that
the !.urpect was held incommunicado and awakened late at night for questioning. and the fact
that the police had sufficient-evidence to warrant booking the defendant but refrained from
doing so, indicated that the detention produced the disclosure.
The dissent agreed with the interpretation
of the McNabb rule expressed by the concurring
opinion. However, the dissent maintained that
there was no evidence that the detention was for
the purpose of producing the confession. On
the contrary, it was said, the delay was necessary to enable the police to verify the information furnished by the defendant. In addition,
the dissent concluded, even if the McNabb rule
was violated, there was sufficient evidence other
than the confession to sustain the conviction.

Confession Obtained While Defendant is
Under Drug Influence Held Voluntary-Defendant was arrested on suspicior of murder
and taken to a police station for questioning.
During the interrogation, he complained of
sickness and requested a doctor. A police
physician was summoned and the questioning
ceased. The physician found that defendant
was a narcotics addict and diagnosed his illness
as being an acute reaction caused by the withdrawal of narcotic drugs. To relieve and pacify
the defendant, the physician gave him an injection of sodium. phenobarbital and hyoscine
hydrobromide, which was described as routine
treatment in such cases. Thereafter the interrogation resumed, although it was not until
over two hours later that he was queried as to
the murder. Defendant then confessed, in
answer to questions propounded by the police,
that he committed the crime. The next day,
defendant was taken to the state's attorney's
office where his confession was read aloud to
him and he re-affirmed his previous confession.
Two days later, defendant again, admitted his
guilt before the coroner at an inquest. At the
trial, defense counsel contended that the confession was per se involuntary and inadmissible
because it was obtained while the defendant
was under the influence of drugs administered
while in police custody. There was a conflict
in evidence as to the effect of the drug administered to defendant. Testimony by police
experts denied that the drug used could have
any serious affect on the ability of the defendant
to give a voluntary confession. Defendant's
expert witness, however, testified that the drug
impaired defendant's mind for a period of
several hours and then he was incapable during
that time of giving trustworthy answers to
police questioning. The Supreme Court of
Illinois, with two members dissenting, affirmed
the conviction in the trial court, holding that a
confession obtained while the defendant is
under, the influence of drugs administered
pursuant to medical treatment and not for the
purpose of inducing a confession, is voluntary
and hence admissible. People v. Townsend, 11
Ill. 2d 30, 141 N.E. 2d 729 (1957).
On appeal, defendant conceded that the
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drugs were administered with his consent and
at his request. He contended, however, that the
drugs caused the loss of his mental faculties at
the time of the confession, so that the confession
became in effect involuntary. In overruling this
argument, the Court analogized the facts to
intoxication cases. In such cases, the Court
said, both state and federal courts are in accord
that the intoxication of the accused at the time
he confesses affects only the weight, rather than
the admissibility of the confession. It was
considered significant that the drugs were a
routine injection for easing pain and were not
administered for the purpose of inducing a
confession. The court held that so long as the
accused is capable of making a narrative of past
events or of stating his own participation in the
crime, his statements are admissible against
him. It was further noted that the defendant
did not allege that he was under the influence of
drugs when he affirmed his confession in the
state's attorney's office and at the coroner's
inquest.
The dissenting opinion objected to the use of
intoxication cases as illustrative of the principle
of law to be applied. In none of the intoxication
cases, the dissent commented, was the intoxication induced by the police. Where a confession is taken while the defendant is under the
influence of a drug administered by a police
doctor, concluded the dissent, to a defendant in
police custody, a conviction based on such
evidence violates due process of law.
As regards "truth serum" evidence generally,
see Lindsey v. U. S., 237 F. 2d 893 (9th Cir.
1956), in which the various scientific articles
upon the subject are cited in the court's
opinion.

Use of Microphone Rather Than Wire Tap
to Record Telephone Conversation Held to
Violate Federal Wire Tap Act-The defendant
was arrested and charged with violating federal
narcotics laws. At the trial in a federal district
court, an employee of the federal narcotics
bureau testified that, on several occasion., she
had made long distance telephone calls to the
defendant during which the latter had agreed
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to sell narcotics to the federal employee. Several
transactions were consummated as a result of
the telephone conversations. Thereafter, the
prosecution offered in evidence tape recordings
of these conversations. A narcotics agent
testified that, when the federal employee made
the calls to the defendant, a highly sensitive
microphone was placed adjacent to the telephone receiver. While the microphohe was not
attached to the receiver, the agent testified that
it at times had touched the receiver. The
microphone was connected to a tape recorder
which recorded the conversation and, in addition, another agent had an earset plugged into
the tape recorder through which he was able to
overhear the conversation. The defendant, it
was said, was unaware that his conversation
was recorded. The defendant then objected to
the admission of the recordings on the grounds
that they were obtained in violation of section
605 of the Federal Communications Act which
provides that "no person not authorized by
the sender shall intercept any communication
and divulge or publish" its contents. The court
affirmed the objection and excluded the recordings, holding that a recording of a telephone conversation, made without the consent
of both participants, by means of a microphone
rather than the usual wire tap, violates the
federal wire tap act. United States v. Hill, 149 F.
Supp. 83 (S. D. N. Y. 1957).
The court noted that a majority of other
jurisdictions have held that the consent of one
party to a phone conversation is sufficient to
allow a third party who overheard the communication to reveal it. The court, however,
adopted the view that each party is alternately
a sender as well as a receiver and that the consent of both must be obtained before the conversation may be admitted in evidence. Since
here, it was said, only one party consented, the
recording is inadmissible if the method by
which it was secured constituted an "interception" within the meaning of the wire tap act. A
number of cases, it was said, have held that, to
constitute an interception, the conversation
must reach the interceptor before it reaches the
intended receiver. These courts, it was said,
have indicated that the line must be tapped by
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the listener at some point between the sender
and the receiver. The court, however, maintained that the speed of sound renders such a
test fallacious. Furthermore, it was said, "today
there are means available to listen in on telephone calls without the use of an actual tap or
physical contact with the lines of transmission.
To hold that these modem methods are without
the scope of the statute means that the law is a
dead letter."

In another recent case, based on facts similar
to those of the Hill case, it was held that a
recording of a telephone conversation made by
means of a microphone held close to the receiver, with the consent of one party to the
conversation, is not an unlawful interception
within the meaning of the federal wire tap act.
That case adopted the majority view which was
rejected by the Hill case. People v. Lawrence,
308 P. 2d 821 (Cal. Dist. Ct. of App. 1957).

(For other recent case abstracts see pp. 199-204, supra.)

